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CHOICE OF LAW AND PREDICTABILITY OF
DECISIONS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
Michael Ena*
The tale of American choice of law principles has become the story
of a thousand and one inconsistent tort cases.1
—Alan Reed
INTRODUCTION
The unique political landscape of the United States, where each
state is a sovereign over its territory and can enact its laws within
broad limits of the federal Constitution, leads to the lack of “uni-
formity in rules of law from state to state.”2  In cases that implicate
the legal systems of two or more states, courts have to decide which
law will govern the case, but the choice of law rules, as well as their
application by different courts, are all but uniform.3
Choice of law questions often arise in products liability cases be-
cause the product in question was produced in one state, purchased
in another state, and caused an injury in yet another state.4  This
presents a significant challenge to courts, especially in mass tort
actions arising from a long-term exposure to harmful substances in
many different states.5
Before a court can proceed on adjudicating the merits, it needs
to decide which law to apply, and in many cases the court’s choice
of law decision may mean the difference between dismissing the
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009.  I would like to
thank Professor George W. Conk for his valuable advice and guidance.
1. Alan Reed, The Anglo-American Revolution in Tort Choice of Law Principles:
Paradigm Shift or Pandora’s Box?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 867, 898 (2001).
2. Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value Judgments, and Choice of Law, 38
BRANDEIS L.J. 451, 452 (2000) [hereinafter Southerland, Value Judgments].
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
(German-manufactured car purchased in New York caused plaintiff’s injury in
Oklahoma); Trahan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Tenn. 1983)
(plaintiff sued a New York manufacturer of diethylstilbestrol (DES) after she was
diagnosed with cervical cancer in Tennessee caused by her mother’s ingestion of DES
during her pregnancy in North Carolina).
5. See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 232 (Md. 2000) (vacat-
ing certification of two classes of plaintiffs and holding that Maryland choice of law
principles required application of individualized choice of law analysis for each class
member since the class member may have been exposed to tobacco in one state but
experienced illness or was diagnosed with a disease in other states).
1417
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case on a certain motion and allowing the plaintiff to proceed with
discovery and trial.6  It is not surprising that in such cases parties
vigorously litigate choice of law questions, and the appeals process
often reaches the state high courts or even the Supreme Court of
the United States.7
Lack of uniformity in the choice of law methodologies that
American courts use, combined with differences in the rules of law
among states, lead to highly inconsistent and often unpredictable
decisions.8  Even within a single state, courts often lack a coherent
approach to choice of law issues because the state’s choice of law
methodology provides inadequate guidance to the courts.9  While
the certainty, predictability, and uniformity of results are generally
less important in tort cases, in the products liability context, pre-
dictability of judicial decisions is an important factor in evaluating
business risks associated with the marketing of a particular prod-
uct.10  A profusion of laws applicable to mass-produced and mass-
6. See, e.g., Morgan v. Brio Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286, 289-90 (Ohio 1984) (af-
firming application of Kentucky law precluding recovery by a Kentucky plaintiff in-
jured in Kentucky by a meat grinder produced by an Ohio manufacturer and the
dismissal of the case on summary judgment).  Ohio law was more favorable to the
plaintiff and would have allowed him to attempt to prove that the product that caused
the injury was defective. See Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio
1977) for a discussion of Ohio choice of law rules.
7. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 450 U.S. 971 (1981) (upholding application
of Minnesota law where the plaintiff, a Minnesota resident whose husband died from
injuries suffered when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck by an
automobile in Wisconsin, argued for the application of a more favorable Minnesota
law, while the defendant insurance company argued that Wisconsin law more
favorable to the defendant should apply); Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (up-
holding constitutionality of the application of a New York statute over objections of a
New Jersey defendant who gave permission to a third party to drive his car to New
York where the third party injured the plaintiff).
8. Compare Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 892 A.2d 694 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2006), with Alli v. Eli Lilly & Co., 854 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
where the two courts reached opposite results on almost identical sets of facts. See
infra Part II for a detailed discussion of these two decisions.
9. See, e.g., Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 892 A.2d 694 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 917 A.2d 767 (N.J. 2007).  The trial court held that Michigan
law favorable to the defendant applied where a Michigan resident sued a New Jersey
drug manufacturer for the injuries that allegedly resulted from inadequate labeling of
the drug. Rowe, 892 A.2d at 669-70.  The appellate division reversed. Id. at 709.  The
Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed again and remanded the case for the reinstate-
ment of the trial court’s order. Rowe, 917 A.2d at 776. See supra Part II for a detailed
discussion of these cases.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. b (1971) [hereinaf-
ter SECOND RESTATEMENT] (“[T]he values of certainty, predictability and uniformity
of result are of lesser importance in torts than in areas where the parties and their
lawyers are likely to give thought to the problem of the applicable law in planning
their transactions.”).
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marketed undifferentiated products generates substantial costs of
compliance and may lead to uncertainty and economic ineffi-
ciency.11  The uncertainty may force manufacturers to forgo devel-
opment, production, and marketing of otherwise valuable products
that might expose them to unpredictable risk.12  This risk, in turn,
may negatively affect the variety of products available to consum-
ers.13  The utility of products, however, has to be balanced with the
need to make products reasonably safe, which prevents manufac-
turers from externalizing their costs at the expense of consumers.14
This Comment proposes that it is unrealistic to expect a compre-
hensive solution to the consistency and predictability of court deci-
sions in the products liability area.  Value judgments and policy
considerations that underlie court decisions, combined with the
wide discretion that modern choice of law methodologies provide,
make the uniformity of decisions practically impossible.15
Part I analyzes the relevant historical background and develop-
ment of the two prevailing choice of law methodologies for tort
cases—the traditional rule of lex loci delicti of the First Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws16 and the “most significant relationship”
rule of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.17  It shows
how the evolution of American society led to changes in choice of
law methodologies that sacrificed the need for consistent and pre-
dictable choice of law decisions in favor of flexibility and fairness.
11. Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory:  One More Trip to the
Choice-of-Law Well, 2002 BYU L. REV. 759, 775-76 (2002).
12. Id. at 767-69.
13. Id.
14. Cf., e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Lia-
bility for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1212 (2002) (noting that the
limited liability of corporations serves as an investment subsidy “permitting compa-
nies to externalize costs for which they would otherwise be compelled to pay tort
damages”); Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown:  The Regula-
tory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 253 (2002) (“Tort law is the major form of private law that at-
tempts to address regulatory gaps by permitting affected individuals to sue actors that
seek to externalize costs onto others.”).
15. Andrew J. Walker, Conflict of Laws Analyses for the Era of Free Trade, 20 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 1147, 1206 (2005) (“[A]bsent an unusually clear fact scenario . . . the
value judgments implicit in the analyses required by law make it virtually impossible
for courts to apply the necessary analyses with uniformity of results.”).
16. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT] (“The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has
sustained a legal injury.”).
17. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 145 (“The rights and liabilities of the R
parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties . . . .”).
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Part II closely examines the two leading choice of law methodol-
ogies and shows how courts in New Jersey and Indiana apply them
in tort cases.  While New Jersey adopted the Second Restatement
approach, Indiana courts still adhere to the lex loci delicti rule.18
The discussion compares and contrasts the analytic frameworks
used in the two states and their application to products liability
cases.  The comparison is illustrated by a detailed discussion of two
recent New Jersey and Indiana cases where out-of-state plaintiffs
sued in-state manufacturers of pharmaceutical products and where
the courts reached opposite results on almost identical fact pat-
terns.19  The discussion reveals problems that arise from the choice
of law methodologies applied by the two states, including inconsis-
tency and unpredictability of court decisions concerning nationally
marketed products.
Part III uses historical analysis from Part II to argue for changes
in the choice of law approaches, especially in products liability
cases.  Part III also contains a critical discussion of lex loci delicti,
the Second Restatement, and several proposals aimed at improving
the current state of affairs in the choice of law area.
The Comment concludes that an approach that combines en-
hancements to the Second Restatement with federal preemption
for certain types of products may be a more realistic answer to the
question of consistency and predictability of court decisions in
products liability cases.
I. CHOICE OF LAW IN TORT CASES:  HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND MODERN APPROACHES
A. Lex loci delicti:  Law of the Place of Injury
and the First Restatement
Traditionally, in tort cases, American courts applied the law of
the place where the tort was committed, or lex loci delicti.20  The
doctrine, to a significant extent, originated from the works of a
Harvard Law School Professor and United States Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story, whose treatise Commentaries on the Conflict
18. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
19. See Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 892 A.2d 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2006), rev’d, 917 A.2d 767 (N.J. 2007); Alli v. Eli Lilly & Co., 854 N.E.2d 372
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). See infra Part II for a detailed discussion and analysis.
20. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICTS OF LAWS:  FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 11-12 (Little Brown & Co. ed., 1991).
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of Laws, published in 1834,21 provided a comprehensive view of the
subject and was very influential in guiding courts on the issue of
conflict of laws.22  That every nation had exclusive sovereignty over
its territory served as one of Story’s main premises.23  In Story’s
view, a sovereign did not have to recognize laws of other sover-
eigns, although it could voluntarily choose to do so, guided by the
spirit of comity and considerations of utility and mutual
convenience.24
Court decisions of that time reflected Story’s territorial view of
conflict of laws.  For example, in 1843, during Story’s tenure as a
Supreme Court Justice, the Court held that British statutes should
apply in a case where two American ships collided in the British
port of Liverpool.25
Radical improvements in transportation, especially the construc-
tion of new railroads that accompanied the industrial revolution in
the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, resulted in
courts more often having to decide which law governed the exis-
tence of liability and the measure of recovery in a particular tort
action.26  Supreme Court decisions of that period confirmed the
Court’s adherence to the theory that the right to recover in tort
owes its creation and extent solely to the law of the jurisdiction
where the injury occurred.27  For example, in 1904 the Court con-
sidered a wrongful death action brought by Texas survivors of an
21. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834) [hereinaf-
ter STORY, COMMENTARIES].
22. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 466-67 (1856) (citing Story’s treatise
on conflict of laws as an opinion of one “of the most eminent jurists of the country”);
Polydore v. Prince, 19 F. Cas. 950, 951 (D. Me. 1837) (No. 11,257) (“The whole subject
is examined with all the learning which belongs to it by Mr. Justice Story, in his very
learned and profound treatise on the Conflict of Laws . . . .”).
23. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 21, at 19. R
24. Id. at 34-37.  Story pointed out that in a case of a conflict “the rules, which are
to govern, are those, which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the
inconveniences, which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral
necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return.” Id. at 34.
25. Smith v. Condry, 42 U.S. 28, 33 (1843) (“The collision having taken place in
the port of Liverpool, the rights of the parties depend upon the provisions of the
British statutes, then in force; and if doubts exist as to their true construction, we must
of course adopt that which is sanctioned by their own courts.”).
26. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912) (personal injury
action brought by an American employee of a New Jersey corporation who was in-
jured by defective machinery while performing his job duties in Cuba); Slater v. Mexi-
can Nat’l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (wrongful death action brought by the
survivors of a Texas employee of a Colorado railroad company killed while coupling
railroad cars in Mexico).
27. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. Co., 222 U.S. at 478 (“[W]hen an action is brought upon a
cause arising outside of the jurisdiction . . . the duty of the court is not to administer
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employee of a Colorado corporation that operated a railroad from
Texas to Mexico City.28  In the opinion delivered by Justice
Holmes, the Court held that Mexican law should govern since the
employee was killed while coupling two freight cars in Mexico.29
State courts of that time scrupulously adhered to the territorial
rule restricting the effects of their state laws to their state bounda-
ries.30  As the Alabama Supreme Court explained in the famous
case Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll, courts could
not impose liability on the defendant unless the law of the place of
injury provided a cause of action to the plaintiff.31
By the end of the Nineteenth Century, the approach to choice of
law issues became more rigid and formal than the one that Story
originally envisioned.32  In some cases, courts applied foreign laws
that clearly contradicted their own state’s public policy.  As illus-
trated in Carroll, the court denied recovery on the basis of territo-
rial restrictions to an Alabama worker of an Alabama railroad
company for injuries sustained while servicing a train in Mississippi
that resulted from a negligent train inspection in Alabama.33  The
worker sought recovery under the Alabama Employers’ Liability
Act that abolished the harsh fellow servant rule and allowed a
worker to recover from the employer for injuries caused by the
negligence of a fellow worker.34  But the court denied recovery
under the Act holding that it had no effect beyond Alabama
borders.35
One of the major proponents of the territorial approach was
Harvard Law School Professor Joseph Beale, the Reporter for the
First Restatement of Conflict of Laws published by the American
its notion of justice, but to enforce an obligation that has been created by a different
law.”).
28. Slater, 194 U.S. at 126.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 20, at 11-12.
31. 11 So. 803, 808 (Ala. 1893).
32. Cf., e.g., Eric T. Dean, Jr., Reassessing Dred Scott:  The Possibilities of Federal
Power in the Antebellum Context, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 740 (1992) (noting that
Story’s work combined territorial approach with the elements of supranational laws
that jurisdictions presumably accepted unless they had taken affirmative steps to ex-
clude such laws); Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution:  A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 772, 962 (1983) (pointing at overbreadth and rigidity of the choice of
law rules in tort cases during the heyday of territorialist thinking at the beginning of
the Twentieth Century).
33. Carroll, 11 So. at 803-05.
34. Id. at 805.
35. Id. at 806-07.
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Law Institute in 1934.36  Like Joseph Story’s works in the Nine-
teenth Century, Professor Beale’s treatise on conflict of laws influ-
enced courts’ decisions in the first half of the Twentieth Century.37
According to Beale, the purpose of choice of law was to find the
jurisdiction whose substantive law would govern adjudication of
the case.38
This approach was firmly rooted in the case law of that time.39
For example, in Young v. Masci, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the application of New York law by a New Jersey court in
the case brought by a New York resident injured in New York by a
New Jersey motorist, holding that liability in tort was determined
by the law of the place of injury.40
The First Restatement incorporated Beale’s doctrinal views and
stated that in tort cases, “[t]he place of wrong is in the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort
takes place.”41  Although the First Restatement faced harsh criti-
cism as soon as it was published, as a practical matter, lex loci
delicti led to predictable results, prevented forum shopping, and
was relatively easy to apply in most of the cases.42  Its territorial
approach yielded acceptable results and served as a natural analyti-
cal basis for resolving choice of law issues in the Nineteenth and
early Twentieth Centuries when state boundaries were much more
than mere lines on the map.43  The socio-economic progress of the
Twentieth Century changed that.44  The growing role of the federal
36. See Reed, supra note 1, at 879. Under this territorial approach, also known as
the doctrine of vested rights, courts enforced rights vested in the plaintiff under the
law of a particular jurisdiction but refused to enforce penal statutes of other jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 198 (N.Y. 1918).  For a
modern treatment of the issue, see Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and
Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987).
37. See, e.g., Loucks, 120 N.E. at 200-201.  Judge Cardozo relied on Professor
Beale’s treatise in holding that the Massachusetts wrongful death statute applies
where a New York resident, while traveling on a highway in Massachusetts, was run
down and killed through the alleged negligence of employees engaged in their busi-
ness. Id.
38. JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 275 (1935).
39. See, e.g., Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933); see also Bert J. Miano,
Abandoning the “Toothless Old Dog” of Lex Loci Delicti in Tort Actions, 20 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 443, 443 (1997) (noting that lex loci was the dominant choice of law
methodology in the first half of the Twentieth Century).
40. 289 U.S. at 258.
41. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 377. R
42. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J.
1277, 1282-83 (1989).
43. See Southerland, Value Judgments, supra note 2, at 466. R
44. Id. at 470-73.
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government, the advancements in science and technology, and the
rapid economic changes increased mobility of people and goods
across state lines within the much more unified and integrated na-
tion.45  In this new socio-economic environment, lex loci delicti
more often than before produced results that, like the denial of
recovery in Carroll, offended the basic notions of fairness and sub-
stantial justice.46
The outcome often depended on entirely fortuitous events.  Re-
turning to Carroll, there the decision depended on whether the in-
jury occurred before or after the train crossed the Alabama state
lines on its way to Meridian, Mississippi.47  Likewise, in Carter v.
Tillery, recovery depended on the fact that an aircraft on its way
from New Mexico to Texas was forced to land in Mexico and not in
the United States.48
Under the territorial rule of lex loci delicti, the determination as
to which state’s law applied to all issues of the case completely dis-
regarded the substantive law of the states involved in the conflict.49
As a result, courts and commentators increasingly voiced their dis-
satisfaction with the mechanical approach of lex loci delicti because
it did not take into account the interests of the involved states, es-
pecially where the place of injury was truly fortuitous.50  As profes-
sors Cheatham and Reese51 wrote in 1952, one of the problems
with the traditional approach stemmed from the belief that “all as-
pects of choice of law could be handled satisfactorily by a relatively
small number of simple rules . . . .  This view . . . had obvious ap-
45. Id.
46. Alabama Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 805 (Ala. 1892); see supra
text accompanying notes 31-35. R
47. Alabama Great S. R.R. Co., 11 So. at 806.
48. Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex. App. 1953) (refusing jurisdiction
only because the aircraft accidentally landed in Mexico although all the parties were
residents of Texas).
49. BEALE, supra note 38, at 311-12 (“[N]o statute has force to affect any person,
thing, or act . . . outside of the territory of the state that passed it.”).
50. See, e.g., Max Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong:  A Study in the Method of Case
Law, 19 TUL. L. REV. 4, 29 (1944) (“[W]here place of wrong is interpreted as place of
harm and harm at that place was not reasonably foreseeable, the rule fails to fulfill its
purpose, an antagonism arises between the ideal of uniformity and that of protection
of justified expectations, and unless we worship uniformity for its own sake, the for-
mer ideal has to yield.”).
51. Professor Reese served as the Reporter for the Second Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws.
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peal because it seemed to promise both certainty of result and ease
of application.  Its falsity is now generally recognized . . . .”52
Nevertheless, the traditional lex loci delicti approach dominated
American jurisprudence until the beginning of the “choice of law
revolution” in the early 1960s.53  In the forty years to follow, most
states abandoned the traditional rule, and by the end of the Twenti-
eth Century, only ten states still used it to decide choice of law
issues in tort cases.54
B. Exceptions to the Traditional Rule
To avoid undesirable results, courts created a variety of excep-
tions or “escape devices” that allowed them, in certain cases, to
circumvent the rigid traditional rule.55  As the number of excep-
tions grew, however, the exceptions undermined the main benefits
of lex loci delicti:  judicial economy as well as the uniformity and
predictability of results.56
Some courts managed to escape the outcome lex loci delicti pre-
scribed by re-characterizing tort cases under some other category.57
For example, in Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., a pas-
senger of an automobile rented in Connecticut was injured through
the negligent operation of the automobile in Massachusetts.58  The
Connecticut high court re-characterized the action as ex contractu
52. Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L. M. Reese, Choice Of The Applicable Law, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 959, 959 (1952) (citations omitted).
53. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2004:
Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 942 (2004).
54. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000:
As the Century Turns, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 3 (2001).
55. Southerland, Value Judgments, supra note 2, at 473 (“It was apparent that R
these techniques were being pressed into service because courts didn’t like the results
called for by the traditional rules.”).
56. See, e.g., Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that
court-created exceptions to the traditional rule undermined its main virtues, the cer-
tainty, uniformity, and predictability of results).
57. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 207 (N.H. 1966) (“Some jurisdictions,
experiencing . . . dissatisfaction with the mechanical place of wrong rule, have substi-
tuted a straight characterization approach. This approach would reach different re-
sults according to whether a torts case could be technically re-characterized as a
contracts case, as a family law case, as one presenting a procedural question, or under
some other key-number section heading which would enable a court to vary its choice
of law subjectively.”).
58. Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A.2d 163, 163-64 (Conn.
1928).
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and allowed the plaintiff to avoid the Massachusetts law that
barred recovery.59
Other courts created public policy exceptions when application
of the law of the place of injury was prejudicial to the general inter-
ests of the forum state and its citizens.  For example, in a 1930 deci-
sion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a result that was
opposite to the one in Carroll.60  The court held that Workmen’s
Compensation Act of Wisconsin applied to Wisconsin workers in-
jured while performing their job duties outside the state because
“[t]he interest of the state in the protection of the health and lives
of its citizens . . . is the same whether its citizens be injured in their
employment in this state or outside its borders.”61
In 1953 the Supreme Court of California, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Traynor, held that survival of liability was a procedural issue
and applied California law that allowed injured plaintiffs to sue the
estate of the deceased defendant in a personal injury case where
California plaintiffs had been injured in a car accident in Arizona.62
Finally, in certain cases, the Due Process and the Full Faith and
Credit clauses of the United States Constitution forced courts to
refrain from a rigid application of lex loci delicti to ensure that
states did not reach beyond the limits imposed on them by their
status as coequal sovereigns in the federal system.63
C. Departure from the Traditional Rule
As courts created new exceptions and legal scholars increasingly
criticized the traditional approach proposing alternative theories,
by the early 1960s the scene was set for what became known as the
“American choice of law revolution.”64  Acknowledging limitations
59. Id. at 165.  For contract cases, the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws pre-
scribed application of law of the place of contract, in this case, Connecticut law. FIRST
RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 311. R
60. Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard, 230 N.W. 622, 624 (Wis. 1930).
61. Id.; see also supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. R
62. Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
63. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The United States
Supreme Court held in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, “for a State’s substantive law
to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a signifi-
cant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” 449 U.S. 302, 312-13
(1981).
64. See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW
REVOLUTION:  PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).  The changes in
the choice of law jurisprudence paralleled changes in the substantive tort law where
legislatures abrogated old statutes limiting recovery in personal injury cases and
courts overruled old precedents barring recovery when the plaintiff was also negli-
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of the traditional rule and influenced by scholarly works, some
courts, unwilling to create yet another exception, decided to break
away from the old rule and to use an alternative approach.  For
example, in 1957, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that even
though the plaintiff sustained injuries in an accident in Wisconsin,
he could bring the action under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act
since all the parties involved were residents of Minnesota and the
sale of intoxicants to the allegedly intoxicated driver took place in
Minnesota.65  As the Schmidt decision indicated, instead of a for-
mal application of territorial rules, courts started looking at the re-
lationship between the subject matter of the controversy and the
states whose laws were implicated.66
In 1962, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the ex-
istence of a new approach to choice of law decisions67 and affirmed
its constitutionality:
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact
with the activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the
interests possessed by the States involved, could constitutionally
apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another state
having such an interest in the multistate activity.68
The following year was marked with the watershed Babcock v.
Jackson decision.  In that case, the New York Court of Appeals
abandoned the traditional rule in favor of the “grouping of con-
tacts approach,” noting that in tort cases the doctrine of vested
rights ignores jurisdictional interests  other than those where the
tort occurred.69
The straightforward facts and inequitable result produced by the
traditional rule made Babcock an ideal case for the adoption of a
gent. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403,
412 (2000) [hereinafter Juenger, Third Restatement].
65. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 82 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1957) (holding that
the interests of equity and justice required that the principles of the First Restatement
did not apply to the facts of the case).
66. Id. at 368.
67. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12 (1962) (“Recently there has been a
tendency on the part of some States to depart from the general conflicts rule in order
to take into account the interests of the State having significant contact with the par-
ties to the litigation.”).
68. Id. at 15.
69. 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. 1963).  After the New York Court of Appeals had
successfully used the new approach in a number of contract cases, it found it equally
applicable to tort cases.  The decision received praise from many prominent legal
scholars. See, e.g., Cavers et al., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Develop-
ment in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963).
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new approach.70  The defendant driver, his wife, and the plaintiff
passenger, all New York residents, started their car trip in New
York and were involved in a single-car accident in Ontario, Ca-
nada, where the defendant lost control of the car and it crashed
into a stone wall severely injuring the plaintiff.71  While the appli-
cable Ontario statute would have completely prevented plaintiff’s
recovery, New York law allowed recovery if the defendant was
negligent.72  The court felt that the interests of justice would be
better served by adopting a new rule that called for the application
of law of the state that had the most significant grouping of con-
tacts with the facts of the case.73  Essentially, the contact analysis
served as an indirect way to identify and apply the policy of the
state most concerned with the outcome of the particular case.74  As
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed out a year later, although
courts and scholars wrote about evaluating contacts and relation-
ships when discussing choice of law issues, they were primarily con-
cerned with state policies and interests implicated by the
conflicting laws.75
In contrast, the methodology of the Second Restatement dis-
cussed in the next section prescribes a direct analysis of policies
and interests behind the laws implicated in the conflict.
D. The Second Restatement:  The Most
Significant Relationship Approach
As criticism of the traditional lex loci delicti rule grew, in 1953
the American Law Institute started to work on the Second Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws.76  The new Restatement was pub-
70. See Babcock, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 749 (“Justice, fairness and ‘the best practical result’ may best be achieved
by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relation-
ship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation.” (citations omitted)).
74. Id.
75. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 802 (Pa. 1964) (aban-
doning the lex loci delicti rule in favor of a more flexible choice of law approach that
permitted taking into account state interests and policies underlying each issue before
the court).
76. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law:  The Restate-
ment (First, Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 330-331 (1997).  Pro-
fessor Willis L. M. Reese of the Columbia University School of Law served as the
Reporter for the Second Restatement, which was approved for publication at the In-
stitute’s annual meeting of 1969. Id.
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lished in 1971.77  It reflected changes in judicial approaches and the
corpus of law developed after the publication of the First Restate-
ment.78  The Second Restatement rejected the rigid rules of the
First Restatement and attempted to provide a much more flexible
case-by-case and issue-by-issue approach for deciding choice of law
questions.79  The provisions of the Second Restatement were “ec-
lectic in nature” since the authors attempted to accommodate a
number of different legal theories and social values.80
In tort cases, section 145 of the Second Restatement called for
the application of local law of the state where the injury occurred,
unless some other state had a more “significant relationship” to the
occurrence and the parties:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an
issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to
the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles
of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.81
Section 6 of the Second Restatement provided the following set
of principles to help courts determine if there was a state with a
more significant relationship than the state of the occurrence:82
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
77. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, ch. 7, tit. 1 (discussing the new position R
taken by the Second Restatement).
78. See generally Jeffrey M. Shaman, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. See Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited,
34 MERCER L. REV. 501, 508 (1983) (“The Restatement Second provisions on choice
of law can be described as eclectic in nature since they rely on a variety of different
theories and values.”).
81. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 145. R
82. The principles stated in section 6 first appeared in the 1952 article by
Cheatham and Reese. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. R
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(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the rela-
tive interests of those states in the determination of the particu-
lar issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.83
The authors of the Second Restatement did not intend to pro-
vide an exhaustive list of factors and did not imply their relative
importance by ordering the factors in a specific way.84  On the con-
trary, in their comments, the authors explained that courts might
consider any other relevant factors to resolve choice of law issues,
and depending on the facts of a particular case, assign different
weight to certain factors or groups of factors.85
Unlike the jurisdiction selection rules of the First Restatement,
where the choice of law decision applied to all issues in a particular
case, the Second Restatement added extra flexibility in accommo-
dating interests of several states by allowing courts to make choice
of laws decisions on an issue-by-issue basis, thus giving them a wide
discretion in picking and choosing which law to apply to a particu-
lar issue of the controversy.86
In order to identify and analyze problems arising from the appli-
cation of the lex loci delicti and Second Restatement methodolo-
gies in products liability cases, Part II takes a closer look at choice
of law rules of two jurisdictions, Indiana and New Jersey.
83. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 6. R
84. Id. § 6 cmt. c.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 145 cmt. d (“Each issue is to receive separate consideration if it is one
which would be resolved differently under the local law rule of two or more of the
potentially interested states.”).  This approach is also known as depecage.  In French,
de´pec¸age means dismemberment and originates from de´pecer, which means to carve
up or analyze minutely. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW (Merriam-Web-
ster 1996). See also Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind. 2004) (“Depe-
cage is the process of analyzing different issues within the same case separately under
the laws of different states.”).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-5\FUJ501.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-NOV-07 11:13
2007] CHOICE OF LAW AND PREDICTABILITY 1431
II. CHOICE OF LAW IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES IN INDIANA
AND NEW JERSEY:  LEX LOCI DELICTI VS.
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS
A. Indiana Choice of Law Approach for Tort Cases
Indiana traditionally used lex loci delicti as its choice of law rule
in tort cases.87  For example, in 1888 the Supreme Court of Indiana,
citing Joseph Story’s treatise on conflict of laws, held that Michigan
law governed a wrongful death case where an Indiana worker was
killed while coupling railroad cars in Michigan.88
One hundred years later, in Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v. Gree-
son, the court revisited the issue and decided to add some flexibil-
ity to its rigid traditional rule.89  In Hubbard, the plaintiff, an
Indiana resident and her husband’s administratrix, brought a prod-
ucts liability suit against Hubbard, an Indiana manufacturer, alleg-
ing that a defect in a lift unit manufactured by Hubbard caused her
husband’s death while her husband, also an Indiana resident,
worked in Illinois replacing street lights.90
The applicable substantive laws of Illinois and Indiana had sig-
nificant differences. Unlike Illinois, Indiana completely barred re-
covery if the product represented an open and obvious danger or
was misused.91  Upon finding a true conflict of laws, the Indiana
court turned to its lex loci delicti rule that pointed to the applica-
tion of Illinois law in order to resolve the conflict.92
The court noted that, unlike Indiana, any of the bordering states
would have applied the substantive law of Indiana had the plaintiff
filed her suit there and concluded that the rigid application of lex
loci delicti to this case would lead to an inappropriate result.93  To
avoid this, the court turned to the Second Restatement in order to
add a fallback provision to its rigid traditional rule.94
87. See supra Part I.A for a detailed discussion of lex loci delicti.
88. Burns v. Grand Rapids & Ind. R.R. Co., 15 N.E. 230, 233 (Ind. 1888).
89. 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
90. Id. at 1072.
91. Id. at 1073.
92. Id. (“The tort is said to have been committed in the state where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place.”).
93. Id. at 1073 (“Had plaintiff . . . filed suit in any bordering state the only forum
which would not have applied the substantive law of Indiana is Indiana.”).
94. Id. at 1073.
In a large number of cases, the place of the tort will be significant and the
place with the most contacts.  In such cases, the traditional rule serves well
. . . .  In those instances where the place of the tort bears little connection to
the legal action, this Court will permit the consideration of other factors such
as:
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The Hubbard court changed the Indiana choice of law rules to
benefit the defendant, a local manufacturer.95  In this respect, the
decision is somewhat unusual, since courts usually altered their
choice of law rules in cases where the changes benefited the plain-
tiffs.96  Although the Indiana Supreme Court never admitted it, the
likely reason for the change was the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague that declared
unconstitutional the application of law of the state that did not
have significant contacts or an aggregation of contacts with the
subject matter of the litigation.97
Also, lex loci delicti, at least to some extent, favors local manu-
facturers in that it inhibits class actions against them.98  This favor-
itism may be an additional reason for the unwillingness of some
jurisdictions, including Indiana, to abandon the traditional rule.
After the Hubbard court affirmatively relied on the Second Re-
statement, some commentators interpreted that decision as a par-
tial adoption of the Second Restatement and argued that the court
should fully adopt the Restatement approach as its choice of law
methodology.99
In Simon v. United States, however, the court shattered these
hopes and forcefully rejected the Second Restatement.100  The
1) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
2) the residence or place of business of the parties; and
3) the place where the relationship is centered.
Id. at 1073-74 (citing SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 145). R
95. See id. at 1074.
96. See, e.g., supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text; but cf. Dowis v. Mud R
Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 415-19 (Ga. 2005) (refusing to abandon lex loci delicti
and applying law more favorable to the defendant).
97. 450 U.S. 971 (1981); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text. R
98. See e.g., Drooger v. Carlisle Tire & Wheel Co., No. 1:05-CV-73, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20823, at *22 (D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006).
Under the lex loci delicti rule, “if this case were certified as a nationwide
class action, the Court would have to try the case under the laws of the 50
states . . . . While not necessarily the death knell to certification, a nation-
wide class under every state’s law would only be permissible were there are
no conflicts of law.” Id.
99. See, e.g., David A. Moore, Note, Hubbard v. Greeson: Indiana’s Misapplica-
tion of the Tort Sections of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 79 IND. L.J.
533, 565 (2004) (arguing that “[t]he Indiana Supreme Court should . . . improve the
working operation of Indiana conflicts law for torts by including the policy analysis of
section 6 thereby aligning itself with modern choice-of-law theory”).
100. 805 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Ind. 2004).  This was a wrongful death action brought by
the estates of individuals killed in Kentucky in a crash of a small private aircraft that
resulted from the errors in a chart published by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in Washington, D.C., and a mistake of FAA air traffic controllers based in
Indianapolis, Indiana.  Neither the victims of the crash nor the aircraft owners had
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court also specifically denounced depecage, the doctrine endorsed
by the Second Restatement that allowed courts to make choice of
law decisions on an issue-by-issue basis.101
B. New Jersey Choice of Law Approach for Tort Cases
As far as their choice of law rules are concerned, Indiana and
New Jersey are on opposite sides of the spectrum.  In 1967, en-
couraged by the New York Court of Appeals decision in Babcock
v. Jackson,102 the Supreme Court of New Jersey, on very similar
facts, decided to abandon the traditional rule of lex loci delicti in
favor of the interest analysis approach.103  The court, however, did
not provide any framework for the analysis.
Three years later, in Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., another car
accident case, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged diffi-
culties in the application of the new methodology and attempted to
clarify it.104  The court outlined a two-step process for deciding
which law applies.105  First, the court determined state policies un-
derlying the conflicting laws.106  After that, to decide which law ap-
plies, the court assessed and balanced the states’ interests in
furthering their respective policies.107
In Veazey v. Doremus, the New Jersey Supreme Court used the
governmental interest analysis to determine that Florida law gov-
erned a suit that arose from a car crash in New Jersey where both
parties were Florida residents.108  The court pointed out that the
Second Restatement analysis yielded the same result.109
Ten years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed and
clarified the use of the flexible governmental interest standard in
Gantes v. Kason Corp. without mentioning the Second Restate-
ment.110 Gantes was a products liability claim against a New Jersey
any connection with Indiana or Washington, D.C., and the plane never flew through
Indiana airspace. Id.
101. Id.
102. 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1963).
103. See Mellk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1967).  See also supra notes 67-73 R
and accompanying text for a discussion of Babcock v. Jackson.
104. 263 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1970).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 132-35.
107. Id. at 135-37.
108. 510 A.2d 1187 (N.J. 1986).
109. Id. at 1191.   The likely reason for this note was that at the time of the court’s
decision in Veazey, Florida already used the Second Restatement as its choice of law
methodology for tort cases. See Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999,
1001 (Fla. 1980) (adopting the Second Restatement for tort cases).
110. 679 A.2d 106, 109 (N.J. 1996).
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manufacturer brought by the administrator of the estate of a Geor-
gia worker killed at her work at a Georgia plant when she was
struck in the head by a moving part of a shaker machine.111
In Gantes, the court provided a three-prong analysis frame-
work.112  First, the court asked whether there was a true conflict113
between the laws of two or more states with respect to each issue in
controversy.114  For each issue where a true conflict existed, the
court had to turn to the second prong of the analysis and determine
the interests of each state in resolving that issue.115  The third
prong required the court to compare and weigh the identified in-
terests to determine which law should govern each issue in the con-
troversy.116  Unlike the Indiana rule that required the application
of law of a single state to all issues of the controversy, the New
Jersey standard allowed application of law of different states on an
issue-by-issue basis, and thus provided courts with more flexibility
in their choice of law decisions.117  The flip side of this flexibility
was the increased uncertainty of the decisions.
The Gantes court found that New Jersey had a strong interest in
deterring the manufacture and distribution of unsafe products
within the state118 and reversed the lower court decision to apply
the Georgia statute of repose that barred recovery.119  The court
also noted that the decision allowing the claim to proceed did not
undermine Georgia’s interest in fair compensation for its citizens
injured by unsafe products.120
The Gantes decision provided New Jersey courts with some gui-
dance on how to apply the governmental interest standard.121  It
encouraged the New Jersey courts to decide choice of law issues by
properly identifying and balancing relevant governmental interests
instead of relying on a mechanical counting of contacts.122  In prac-
111. Id. at 107.
112. Id. at 109-13.
113. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice Of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277,
311 (1990).  A true conflict occurs when the court determines that more than one
state has a true interest in the dispute, and state laws implicated in the conflict yield
incompatible results. Id.
114. Gantes, 679 A.2d at 109.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 113.
117. Id. at 109.
118. Id. at 111-12.
119. Id. at 116.
120. Id. at 115.
121. See id. at 109-13.
122. Cf., e.g., Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 475 A.2d 648, 652-53 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).  In this pre-Gantes decision, a New Jersey court attempted
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tice, however, because the formulation of the standard was vague,
its application inevitably suffered from subjectivity and
inconsistency.123
In search of better guidelines, the New Jersey Supreme Court
turned to the Second Restatement to supplement its governmental
interest analysis standard.  In its 1999 decision, Fu v. Fu, the Court
heavily relied on the analytical framework of the Second Restate-
ment, finding it compatible with the governmental interest analysis
choice of law methodology.124
Three years later, in yet another car crash case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court reaffirmed its preference for the analytical frame-
work of the Second Restatement and emphasized its governmental
interest analysis provisions.125  It is very likely that the Second Re-
statement’s reliance on different theories and its attempt to accom-
modate several choice of law methodologies facilitated this
transition.126
The next section discusses a recent case that provides a good ex-
ample of how New Jersey courts apply the Second Restatement’s
choice of law methodology in products liability cases.
C. Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.:  New Jersey Choice
of Law Methodology Applied
In 2006, Robert Rowe (“Rowe”), a Michigan resident, brought a
products liability action in New Jersey against Hoffmann-La Roche
Inc. (“Hoffmann”), a New Jersey pharmaceutical company.127
Rowe alleged that Hoffmann failed to adequately warn users about
to apply the governmental interest analysis in a product liability claim brought by a
North Carolina plaintiff against a New Jersey manufacturer.  The court appeared to
base its choice of law decision not on the analysis of the relevant governmental inter-
ests of the two states but on the number of contacts each of the states had with the
facts of the case:  “[O]n balance, the respective contacts of the related jurisdictions
dictate the application of North Carolina law.” Id. at 653.
123. One of the indications of this inconsistency was the trial court’s decision to
apply New York law in Fu v. Fu subsequently reversed by the appellate division in Fu
v. Fu, 707 A.2d 473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), which in turn was reversed by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Fu v. Fu, 733 A.2d 1133, 1138-50 (N.J. 1999).
124. 733 A.2d 1133, 1139 (N.J. 1999).  The court held that pro-recovery New York
law should govern the case where plaintiffs, all New Jersey residents, were injured in a
single-car accident in New York. Id. at 1149-50.
125. Erny v. Estate of Merola, 792 A.2d 1208, 1217-18 (N.J. 2002).
126. See supra Part I.D for a discussion of the Second Restatement. But see James
P. George, False Conflicts and Faulty Analyses:  Judicial Misuse of Governmental In-
terests in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 23 REV. LITIG. 489, 493-94
(2004) (arguing that the governmental interest analysis is incompatible with the Sec-
ond Restatement approach).
127. 892 A.2d 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d 917 A.2d 767 (N.J. 2007).
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possible psychological side effects of its acne prescription drug Ac-
cutane.128  Rowe further alleged that that in 1997 at the age of six-
teen, as a result of taking Accutane, he became severely depressed
and made several suicide attempts.129
Choice of law became a highly-contested issue in this case be-
cause under the Michigan statute, a Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) approval of a drug and its labeling granted the drug man-
ufacturer absolute immunity from products liability claims unless
the manufacturer obtained the approval by a fraudulent misrepre-
sentation or bribery.130  The relevant New Jersey statute treated
the FDA approval of drug labeling and safety warnings as a rebut-
table presumption of their adequacy.  The plaintiff could overcome
this presumption by presenting competent evidence that the manu-
facturer had unreasonably omitted critical safety warnings in the
drug labeling or unreasonably disregarded a feasible safer alterna-
tive design.131
Since the case involved a true conflict of laws, the trial court had
to resolve the choice of law issue under the Gantes governmental
interest standard.132  Both states had sufficient contacts to the facts
of the case, and the application of the law of either state was con-
stitutionally permissible.133  Hoffmann contended that Michigan
substantive law should control the case, while Rowe argued for the
application of New Jersey law.134
The trial court found that New Jersey had an interest in setting a
high standard of care for its drug manufacturers.135  The court also
found that Michigan law reflected the state’s interest in providing
its residents with pharmaceutical products by creating more pre-
dictable standards of care for drug companies that would en-
courage the drug companies to market their products in
Michigan.136  After comparing the state interests, the trial court de-
cided that Michigan’s interest in providing its citizens with afforda-
ble medications prevailed over New Jersey’s interest in regulating
128. Id. at 698-99.
129. Id. at 698.
130. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2007).
131. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2007).
132. See supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text. R
133. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. R
134. See Rowe, 892 A.2d at 698.
135. See id. at 700.
136. See id.
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its manufacturers and granted a summary judgment to Hoffmann
under the Michigan statute.137
The appellate division in a two-to-one decision disagreed and
concluded that New Jersey had a strong interest in the application
of its rebuttable presumption which the legislature intended as a
balanced means of providing a substantial but not absolute defense
to drug manufacturers while ensuring the safety of consumers.138
The court also found that the Michigan statute was intended to
protect its local drug manufacturers, and that Michigan did not
have an interest in denying recovery to its resident.139  The court
applied the framework of the Second Restatement to these find-
ings and relied on Gantes to hold that the application of New
Jersey law in this case would better serve the interests of deter-
rence and compensation.140  The dissent warned about an adverse
impact of tort liability on the pharmaceutical industry and against
allowing out-of-state plaintiffs to circumvent their state legisla-
ture’s policy choices by filing their actions in New Jersey courts.141
Hoffmann appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.142  On appeal, Hoffmann argued that the application of
New Jersey law would undermine Michigan’s interest in protecting
drug manufacturers and providing its residents with better access
to affordable medications.143  It also argued that the New Jersey
deterrence interest was very limited or non-existent because of the
comprehensive FDA regulation of drug manufacturers.144  Hoff-
mann further asserted that the appellate court’s decision would
lead to the application of New Jersey law whenever an out-of state
plaintiff, whose state laws were less favorable, sued a New Jersey
manufacturer in New Jersey, and thus, would encourage forum
shopping.145  The decision would also, according to Hoffmann, un-
dermine the interstate comity since states like Michigan would not
be able to regulate certain activities that take place within their
borders.146
137. See id. at 707.
138. See id. at 707-08.
139. See id. at 708 (citing SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 146 cmt. e). R
140. See id. at 709.
141. Id. at 710-11 (Wefing, J., dissenting).
142. Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 917 A.2d 767 (N.J. 2007).
143. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 11-19, Rowe, 917 A.2d 767 (No. A-59,454).
144. Id. at 23-26.
145. Id. at 36.
146. Id. at 34-37.
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In response, Rowe argued that the application of New Jersey’s
rebuttable presumption, as opposed to the grant of absolute immu-
nity to the drug manufacturer under Michigan law, would better
serve the interests of New Jersey.147  Rowe limited his argument to
this issue and emphasized that the court should separately consider
the applicability of Michigan substantive law to other issues of the
case.148  In support of his main argument, Rowe attempted to show
that the sole purpose of the Michigan conclusive presumption was
to immunize Michigan drug manufacturers, while the purpose of
the New Jersey rebuttable presumption was to ensure drug safety
through proper judicial risk-utility analysis.149  According to Rowe,
the Michigan conclusive presumption could not have been in-
tended to affect general availability of pharmaceutical products be-
cause of its very limited potential affect on the marketing of
products distributed in all states and in many foreign countries.150
These complex interactions of public policy and substantive law
that courts have to analyze in the application of the analytical
framework of the Second Restatement are in a sharp contrast with
an almost trivial application of the Indiana choice of law rule dis-
cussed in the next section.
D. Alli v. Eli Lilly & Co.:  Indiana Choice of Law Applied
Seven months after the Rowe decision, in September 2006, an
Indiana intermediate appellate court decided Alli v. Eli Lilly &
Co.151  The facts of the case are strikingly similar to those in
Rowe.152  A widow of a Michigan patient brought a products liabil-
ity action against Eli Lilly, an Indiana manufacturer of an an-
tidepressant drug Prozac that the patient ingested a few days
147. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 10, Rowe, 917 A.2d 767 (No. A-59,454).
148. Id. at 11.  As noted in Part I.D, the Second Restatement calls for the issue-by-
issue choice of law analysis. See discussion supra Part I.D.
149. Id. at 17-21 (citing Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 592 A.2d 1176 (N.J. 1991)).
Rowe also relied on Gantes for the proposition that New Jersey had an important
interest in regulating its manufacturers to ensure safety of their products. See id. at 31-
32.  Note that Hoffmann could counter these considerations by arguing that, although
New Jersey had an important governmental interest in regulating its manufacturers,
the New Jersey regulatory interest in this particular case was not significant because,
even if the drug labeling was inadequate in 1997, Hoffmann made it adequate after
the FDA warning in 1998.  Hoffmann could therefore argue that since the FDA prop-
erly preformed its regulatory function, the only outstanding issue was a compensation
of the Michigan plaintiff for the alleged injury, and because Michigan had a predomi-
nant interest in this issue, its law should apply.
150. Id. at 29-30.
151. 854 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
152. Id. at 375.
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before he committed suicide.153  The patient and his wife were both
Michigan residents, and all events related to the patient’s use of
Prozac and his suicide occurred in Michigan.154
At trial, the plaintiff argued for the application of Indiana law.155
The relevant Indiana statute, like its New Jersey counterpart, pro-
vided a rebuttable presumption of safety for FDA-approved
drugs.156  The defendant argued that under Indiana choice of law
rules, Michigan law—law of the place of injury—should apply.157
The trial court agreed and granted the manufacturer’s motion for
partial summary judgment.158
The appellate court affirmed noting that the place of injury is
insignificant only in rare tort cases.159  Since all of the events oc-
curred in Michigan, the court held that the place of injury was sig-
nificant and never reached the second prong of the Indiana choice
of law analysis.160
The Indiana court easily reached an opposite result to the one
reached by the New Jersey appellate court in Rowe despite similar
facts and almost identical relevant substantive law of Indiana and
New Jersey.161  This inconsistency resulted from the difference in
choice of law methodologies of the two states.
E. New Jersey Choice of Law Methodology is Still in Flux
On January 3, 2007, the New Jersey Supreme Court heard an
appeal of Hoffman-La Roche from the two-to-one decision of the
appellate division panel in favor of the application of New Jersey
law.162  Two supreme court justices, the Chief Justice Zazzali and
Justice Albin, recused themselves, and two appellate judges re-
placed them on the panel.163
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 376.
156. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1 (West 2007).
157. Alli, 854 N.E.2d at 375-76.
158. Id. at 376.
159. Id. at 379.
160. See id. It is likely that the second prong of the Indiana choice of law test be-
comes relevant only when the application of the law of the place of injury may call
into question the constitutionality of the court’s decision. See supra text accompany-
ing note 97. R
161. See supra Part II.C.
162. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the appellate division’s decision.
163. See Robert G. Seidenstein, Drug Liability; Out-of-State Suit Rebuffed, 16 N.J.
LAWYER 1 (2007).
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Driven by policy considerations, in a five-to-two decision, the
court reversed the decision below and remanded the case for the
reinstatement of the trial court’s order dismissing the case.164  The
majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Wefing and arguments of the defendant phar-
maceutical company supported by amicus curiae briefs from
industry associations.165  The majority opinion specifically empha-
sized the importance of the pharmaceutical industry for the state
economy and public health.166
At the same time, the majority opinion never mentioned the Sec-
ond Restatement and distinguished Gantes as a case where New
Jersey had a strong interest in deterring manufacture of unsafe
products and the application of New Jersey law did not frustrate
the interests of Georgia.167  The future will prove whether the New
Jersey Supreme Court opinion in Rowe marks an ideological shift
to a less activist approach168 or was a purely policy-driven decision
reversing Gantes preferences for product safety and favoring pro-
tection of local pharmaceutical companies from lawsuits by out-of-
state plaintiffs.169
164. See Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, 917 A.2d 767, 776 (N.J. 2007).
165. See Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Rowe, 917 A.2d 767 (No. A-59,454)
(arguing that the appellate division overvalued New Jersey’s and undervalued Michi-
gan’s interests and disregarded the need for certainty and predictability of results);
Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. and N.J. Defense Ass’n as Amici
Curiae Supporting Reversal of Appellate Division’s Opinion and Dismissal of Case,
Rowe, 917 A.2d 767 (No. A-59,454) (arguing that the majority opinion improperly
weighed New Jersey governmental interests and failed to consider the effect of its
decision on the state’s economy); Brief for Healthcare Institute of N.J Supporting
Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae, Rowe, 917 A.2d 767 (No. A-59,454)
(arguing that the appellate division’s decision will subject New Jersey drug and medi-
cal device manufacturers to the least favorable law and force them to move out of the
state).
166. Rowe, 917 A.2d at 774.  Fourteen of the twenty-five world’s largest pharma-
ceutical companies have major facilities in New Jersey, eleven of which are national
or global headquarters. NEW JERSEY COMMERCE, ECONOMIC GROWTH & TOURISM,
NEW JERSEY’S BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY, http://www.state.nj.us/commerce/pdf/ba/
2005-06-ba-biotech.pdf.  Pharmaceutical companies perform nearly half of the na-
tion’s thirty billion dollar worth of private health research New Jersey. Id.
167. Rowe, 917 A.2d at 773; see also discussion of Gantes supra Part II.B.
168. See Seidenstein, supra note 163. R
169. The dissent pointed out that legislation currently pending in the Michigan Sen-
ate proposes to enact a rebuttable presumption of drug safety with retroactive appli-
cability. Rowe, 917 A.2d at 780 (Stern, J., dissenting) (citing H.B. 4044-4045, 94th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2007)).  Since the proposed Michigan legislation was very simi-
lar to the New Jersey rebuttable presumption, the dissenting opinion suggested to
wait a reasonable period of time. Id.  The majority rejected this proposal but still
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The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Rowe once again
demonstrated a lack of guidance provided by New Jersey’s choice
of law methodology.170  As a result, the court’s policy preferences
and not the principled application of law guided by doctrinal con-
siderations determined the outcome of this case.  The court deci-
sions in Rowe suggest that the forty years since New Jersey
abandoned the traditional rule in favor of a more flexible ap-
proach171 did not result in development of a consistent approach to
choice of law issues, and New Jersey courts still lack guidance in
this area.
Part III discusses several ways to improve consistency and pre-
dictability of choice of law decisions.
III. CONSISTENCY AND PREDICTABILITY OF CHOICE OF LAW
DECISIONS:  PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Choice of Law and Socio-Economic Progress
Although the traditional lex loci delicti rule was appropriate in
the Nineteenth Century, the increasing mobility of society made
the rule increasingly inadequate.172  Several states abandoned the
traditional rule in the 1960s, and the trend of adopting more flexi-
ble choice of law methodologies continues.173  The publication of
drafts and the final version of the Second Restatement of Conflict
of Laws played an important role in this process.174
Traditionally, the choice of law rules aimed to prevent forum
shopping and provide predictable and uniform results.175  The
choice of law revolution changed these goals.  The proponents of
the modern choice of law methodologies were more concerned
with rigid constraints of the traditional rule that did not allow
insisted that in doing so it advanced Michigan’s interests. Id. at 776 (majority
opinion).
170. Cf. supra note 123 and accompanying text. R
171. See supra Part II.B.
172. See First Nat’l Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo. 1973)
(“When the doctrine of lex loci delicti was first established in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, conditions were such that people only occasionally crossed state boundaries.
Under those circumstances, there was legitimacy in a rule which presumed that per-
sons changing jurisdictions would be aware of the different duties and obligations
they were incurring when they made the interstate journey.”).
173. See supra Part II.C.
174. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Miss. 1969) (adopting Pro-
posed Official Draft of the Second Restatement).
175. See, e.g., Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard In
Forum Shopping:  Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367,
1371 (2004).
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judges to decide cases based upon their notion of justice and policy
preferences.176
Although some courts expressed hope that the adoption of mod-
ern approaches would eventually lead to some consistency in
choice of law decisions, in general, there was little concern at the
time about uniformity and predictability of decisions.177
This new approach was appropriate for individual and, to a great
extent, unique tort cases. Further socio-economic progress and the
proliferation of mass-marketed products, however, led to an ever
increasing number of products liability cases involving parties from
different states.178  These changes often required courts to consider
choice of law issues in the products liability context, but as dis-
cussed in the following sections, neither of the choice of law theo-
ries was suited for that purpose.
B. Lex Loci Delicti :  The Rigid and Anachronistic Rule
In the era of mass production and worldwide distribution of un-
differentiated products, the application of the rigid traditional rule
in products liability cases precluded courts from taking into ac-
count state policies aimed at protecting consumers from potentially
unsafe products or at limiting liability of domestic manufactur-
ers.179  For example, the result reached by the Alli court was, at
least in part, predicated on the incompatibility of the Nineteenth
Century rule with the realities of the Twenty-First Century.  If
there were reasons to doubt the safety of a product sold to consum-
ers in Indiana, Indiana had a strong interest in protecting its con-
sumers and regulating its manufacturers as expressed in the
176. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d at 181 (noting that “the lex loci delicti
rule is too harsh and inflexible and is an unsatisfactory rule”); supra note 50. R
177. See, e.g., First Nat’l, 514 P.2d at 320 (adopting the Second Restatement meth-
odology for tort cases and expressing a hope that further development of the body of
case law will enable the court to formulate more precise choice of law rules governing
specific areas of law); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796, 806 (Pa. 1964) (“We
are at the beginning of the development of a workable, fair and flexible approach to
choice of law which will become more certain as it is tested and further refined when
applied to specific cases before our courts.”); see also Southerland, Value Judgments,
supra note 2, at 473 (pointing out that “there was certainly a cost in terms of certainty, R
predictability, and uniformity of result—a sacrifice of the virtues of the territorial
system in the service of result-oriented decision making”).
178. See, e.g., Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory:  One More
Trip to the Choice-of-Law Well, 2002 BYU L REV. 759, 774-76 (2002).
179. Courts abandoned lex loci delicti primarily because it prevented them from
making choice of law decisions based upon their policy preferences. See supra Part
I.B.
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Indiana products liability statute.180  Guided by its choice of law
rule, the Indiana court did not even consider its own state’s inter-
ests insisting on the rigid application of the law of the place of
injury.181
When consumer products are manufactured and distributed in
mass quantities, a defective product can cause an injury practically
anywhere in the world.182  Therefore, except for judicial efficiency,
there is little justification to base choice of law rules in products
liability cases on the place where the injury occurred.
At the same time, given the differences in substantive law gov-
erning products liability, and since most of the states abandoned
the traditional rule and adopted several different choice of law
methodologies,183  Indiana’s adherence to the traditional rule con-
tributes to the current state of inconsistency and unpredictability of
results in products liability cases dealing with mass-manufactured
products.
Further, despite its simple appearance, the territorial rule of the
First Restatement which requires identification of the last event
that was necessary to make an actor liable and the place where that
event took place, is difficult to apply where activities crossed juris-
dictional boundaries.  This difficulty is apparent, for example, in
complex products liability cases, such as DES or tobacco
litigation.184
In contrast with the traditional rule, the Second Restatement
and other modern choice of law methodologies provide courts with
virtually unlimited freedom to reach equitable results by taking
into account relevant state policies and balancing competing con-
siderations.  These decisions, however, are highly dependent on
180. IND. CODE § 34-20-5-1 (2007).
181. Alli v. Eli Lilly & Co., 854 N.E.2d 372, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
182. See, e.g., Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 A.2d 106, 113 (N.J. 1996) (noting that
“although place of injury is a significant factor in many tort actions, it does not war-
rant undue weight in product liability cases”); Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 892
A.2d 694, 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (“[T]he place where a product manu-
factured, ultimately comes to rest, and causes injury is a matter of pure fortuity.”).
183. See generally Symeonides, supra note 54.
184. See Trahan v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 505, 505 (M.D. Tenn.
1983) (plaintiff diagnosed with cervical cancer in Tennessee argued that the “last
event” occurred when her mother ingested DES during pregnancy in North Carolina);
Philip Morris, Inc. v.  Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 232 (Md. 2000) (“The [lex loci delicti]
rule is fairly easy to apply when all of the events giving rise to a suit have occurred in
one state, as in a typical negligence action arising from an automobile accident. . . .
The more difficult situation arises when the events giving rise to a suit occur in a
number of states.”).
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courts’ policy preferences and therefore are often inconsistent and
unpredictable.185
C. Second Restatement:  Flexibility vs.
Predictability and Uniformity
During the years that followed its publication, the Second Re-
statement became the leading choice of law methodology.186  There
are several reasons why courts favor the Second Restatement.187
Like other modern choice of law methods, it provides them with
virtually unlimited discretion.188  But unlike those other methodol-
ogies, it projects the appearance of a logical and orderly system
that carries with it the prestige of the American Law Institute.189
Although the majority of states that abandoned the traditional
rule embraced the Second Restatement, Dean Symeonides called
this development a mixed blessing.190  Some courts and commenta-
tors praised the Second Restatement for utilizing “a flexible mix-
ture of the current thinking on choice of law.”191  Others were
uncomfortable with the flexibility it provided192 and claimed that
its eclectic nature193 resulted in a “largely incoherent product.”194
Critics of the Second Restatement usually point out that, while at-
tempting to incorporate several different choice of law theories,
the Second Restatement provided very little guidance to courts and
legal practitioners.195
185. See supra Part II for a detailed discussion.
186. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And
a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437, 439 (2000).
187. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Con-
flicts Restatement:  A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1269-79 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Symeonides, Judicial Acceptance].
188. See id. at 1269-72; see also Juenger, Third Restatement, supra note 64, at 405 R
(“Many courts seem to like the ‘mishmash,’ or ‘kitchen-sink,’ concoction the restaters
produced; after all, it enables judges to decide conflicts cases any which way they
wish.” (citations omitted)).
189. See Symeonides, Judicial Acceptance, supra note 187, at 1276. R
190. See id. at 1277.
191. See, e.g., Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting the
Second Restatement rules for tort cases in Tennessee).
192. See, e.g., Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 417 (Ga. 2005) (insisting
that “[t]he very flexibility of the approach of the Restatement (Second) has proved to
be problematic”).
193. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. R
194. Harvey Couch, Is Significant Contacts a Choice-of-Law Methodology?, 56
ARK. L. REV. 745, 755 (2004).
195. See, e.g., George, supra note 126, at 491 (arguing that the Second Restate- R
ment’s choice of law methodology leads to “choice of law decisions so lacking in uni-
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For example, in personal injury cases, the analysis under the Sec-
ond Restatement rules started with the presumption that the law of
the place of injury governed unless there was a state with a more
significant relationship to the facts of the case.196  To make this de-
termination, the Second Restatement directed the court to priori-
tize and balance the vague considerations of section 6 as well as
any additional factors the court deemed relevant.197  In doing so,
one had to apply the factors listed in section 145(2) to decide which
law applies.198
Many courts complained about the complexity of the Second Re-
statement’s multi-step rules, especially when compared to the
straightforward traditional approach.199  Since courts were not able
to objectively and consistently balance all the competing considera-
tions and principles that the Second Restatement suggested, their
choice of law decisions lacked uniformity and predictability.200
Referring to some of these reasons in a 2004 decision, the Su-
preme Court of Indiana once again rejected an invitation to adopt
the Second Restatement and cited, among others, the following
characterization of the Second Restatement by Professor
Gottesman:201
The [S]econd Restatement thus was a hodgepodge of all theo-
ries.  A court was to compare apples, oranges, umbrellas, and
pandas, and determine which state’s law to apply by the relative
importance assigned to these factors.  The supposed virtue of
the [S]econd Restatement was the freedom it provided courts to
weigh all conceivably relevant factors and then tailor the choice
of law to the circumstances of the case.  That very flexibility was,
formity that the Second Restatement’s balancing test has become chimeric, taking on
vastly different forms in different courts”).
196. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 146. R
197. See id. § 6 cmt. c.
It is not suggested that this list of factors is exclusive. Undoubtedly, a court
will on occasion give consideration to other factors in deciding a question of
choice of law. Also it is not suggested that the factors mentioned are listed in
the order of their relative importance. Varying weight will be given to a par-
ticular factor, or to a group of factors, in different areas of choice of law.
Id.
198. See id. § 145.
199. See, e.g., Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ga. 2005) (“The
approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) certainly fits
a description of complexity.”).
200. The lack of uniformity and predictability in choice of law decisions may dis-
courage settlements and reduce the accuracy of case valuations by attorneys. See
Shirley A. Wiegand, Fifty Conflict of Laws “Restatements”:  Merging Judicial Discre-
tion and Legislative Endorsement, 65 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
201. See Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Ind. 2004).
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however, equally its vice:  courts could arrive at any outcome
applying its factors, and no one could predict in advance what
state’s law governed their actions.202
One might question whether we are worse off now, after most of
the states have abandoned the traditional rule, than in the early
1950s when all of the states followed the rule.  This is certainly the
impression that results from reading Simon v. United States and the
numerous academic critics of the Second Restatement cited in that
decision.203
While the criticism mounted against the Second Restatement
makes a good case for starting the work on the Third Restatement
or some tuning of the Second Restatement,204 it does not justify the
outright rejection of the Second Restatement.
First, even in the early 1950s when the American Law Institute
started to work on the Second Restatement, all jurisdictions still
adhered to the traditional rule, but uniformity and predictability in
the choice of law decisions were wanting.205  In his 1953 paper dis-
cussing choice of law issues related to tort liability resulting from
publishing an injurious material in multiple states,206 Professor
Prosser pointed out inconsistencies in court decisions and labeled
the area of conflict of laws “a dismal swamp, filled with quaking
quagmires and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who
theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensi-
ble jargon.”207
202. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:  The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (1991) (arguing for federal choice of law
rules that will govern resolution of disputes arising in multi-state contexts); see also
LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS:  FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 68
(1991) (noting that the Second Restatement “reminds one of the famous humorous
definition of a camel:  a horse drafted by a committee”).
203. See Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 803-804 (citing Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of
Equal and Territorial States:  The Constitutional Foundations of Choice-of-Law, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992) (“Trying to be all things to all people, it produced
mush.”)); Juenger, Third Restatement, supra note 64, at 405 (“Many courts seem to
like the ‘mishmash,’ or ‘kitchen-sink,’ concoction the restaters produced; after all, it
enables judges to decide conflicts cases any which way they wish. To be sure, the
Second Restatement’s unprincipled eclecticism has done little to strengthen the intel-
lectual underpinnings of our discipline.”).
204. See, e.g., Bruce Posnak, The Restatement (Second):  Some not so Fine Tuning
for a Restatement (Third):  A Very Well-Curried Leflar over Reese with Korn on the
Side (Or is it Cob?), 75 IND. L.J. 561 (2000) (arguing for the Third Restatement as an
improvement and “tuning” of the Second Restatement) [hereinafter Posnak, Restate-
ment Second].
205. See supra Part I.B.
206. Similar issues arise in multi-state products liability actions.
207. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953).
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In the framework of the Second Restatement, consistency and
forum shopping prevention208 were just additional policy consider-
ations that needed to be balanced together with other relevant fac-
tors.  In practice, however, the latter sometimes outweighed the
former or a busy court took a shortcut and skipped a detailed anal-
ysis.209  Moreover, since it is not unusual for a lower court in its
choice of law analysis to apply a different methodology than the
one prescribed by prior decisions of the high court of its jurisdic-
tion, the judicial decisions in this area of law might lack consistency
even within a single jurisdiction.210
The Second Restatement did not and could not solve the prob-
lem of inconsistency in choice of law decisions.  In tort cases, the
main thrust of the Second Restatement and other modern choice
of law methodologies was the flexible accommodation of policies
and interests of several states and the facilitation of fair
judgments.211
Second, the issue of the Second Restatement’s complex method-
ology is exaggerated.  Even in complex cases, where seemingly sim-
ple rules of the First Restatement lead to unacceptable results or
are unworkable, the Second Restatement enabled courts to reach
fair and reasonable results since it provided a justification for their
policy-based decisions.212  After all, courts had to exhibit more in-
genuity to avoid an unjust result by devising a way to re-classify a
tort as a contract, rather than justify an equitable result through
the analysis of facts of the case and their relationship to the rele-
vant state interests.213
208. While traditionally forum shopping has been regarded as evil, some commen-
tators advanced arguments in support of state-state forum shopping.  For a good over-
view of these arguments see George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping—
Why Doesn’t a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 668-75
(1993).
209. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. R
210. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Bell, 735 P.2d 499 (Haw. Ct. App.
1987) (applying Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations despite Hawaii Supreme
Court’s adoption of interest analysis in Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (Haw. 1981)).
211. See Alfred Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1585, 1636 (1985) (“[F]or the judge persuaded that consideration of precedent is a
useful starting-point in dealing with choice-of-law issues, the Second Restatement
provides helpful formulations. At the same time the court in effect is left free to take
account of any argument rationally bearing on a judicious solution.”).
212. See Southerland, Value Judgments, supra note 2, at 511 (“Judges decide in an R
intuitive sort of way what they think they ought to do if their conception of justice is
to be served and then lay hold of some method . . . with which to fashion a rationaliza-
tion for their opinion.”).
213. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. R
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In addition, when analyzing the Second Restatement, one should
keep in mind that it was intended to be a transitional document.214
The vague rules of the Second Restatement did not necessarily re-
quire courts to engage in a serious research effort or accurately
balance all conflicting considerations.  Judges could do as much or
as little as they wanted, from thorough analysis of the policies un-
derlying laws involved in the conflict to a trivial counting of con-
tacts.215  In this sense, it is possible to discuss different levels of
adoption of the rules of the Second Restatement, which might vary
from court to court and even from case to case.216  If one views the
Second Restatement as a document intended to facilitate migration
to a common methodology, the flexibility it provides helps the Sec-
ond Restatement accomplish one of its important goals.
Third, the attempt of the Second Restatement to accommodate
various theories and points of view, although repugnant to theoret-
ical “purists,” served the same purpose of facilitating the adoption
of the Second Restatement by the courts.217
Finally, the main purpose of the Second Restatement was to pro-
vide flexible rules that would enable courts to take into account
important policy considerations and to avoid patently unjust re-
sults.  Unlike critics of the First Restatement who cited numerous
cases where the rule of lex loci delicti led to harsh or meaningless
results,218 critics of the Second Restatement usually appeal to the
authority of scholarly writings and allege theoretical impurity, com-
214. See Reese, supra note 80, at 518-19. (“It was written during a time of turmoil
and crisis when former rules of choice of law were being abandoned, when rival theo-
ries were being fiercely debated, and when serious doubt was expressed about the
practicality, and indeed the desirability, of having any rules at all.”).  Although several
states still adhere to the traditional rule, the American choice of law jurisprudence is
still arguably in the transitional state.  As discussed in Part D below, it is time to make
a next step towards more uniformity and predictability in the choice of law decisions.
215. See, e.g., supra note 122 and the accompanying text. R
216. The history of adoption of the Second Restatement by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court is a good illustration of this. See discussion supra Part II.B.
217. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also Symeon C. Symeonides, R
American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1,
87 (2007) [hereinafter Symeonides, 21st Century] (noting that “methodological or
philosophical purity should not be an end in itself when dealing with complex multis-
tate problems that by definition implicate conflicting national and societal values”);
Symeonides, Judicial Acceptance, supra note 187, at 1269-79.  Dean Symeonides sug- R
gests a few other reasons for a wide adoption of the Second Restatement. Id.
218. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo.
1973) (noting that since all the facts of the case point to Colorado except the fortui-
tous place of accident in South Dakota, “the facts in the case at bar classically demon-
strate the injustice and irrationality of the automatic application of the Lex loci delicti
rule”); see also supra notes 31-35, 48 and accompanying text. R
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plexity, and a lack of guidance.219  For example, the Indiana Su-
preme Court, rejecting the Second Restatement, cited numerous
academic authors but not a single case where injustice resulted
from the use of the Second Restatement.220  Likewise, academic
papers cited in the Simon decision did not provide any examples of
such injustice.221
A year later, the Supreme Court of Georgia, refused to adopt
the Second Restatement analysis in tort cases and complained
about its complexity and lack of guidance.222  The court stated that
“it is well-settled that Georgia will continue to adhere to a tradi-
tional conflict of laws rule” and cited two contract cases and sev-
eral academic sources.223  The court, however, did not provide any
examples of unfair decisions that resulted from the application of
the Second Restatement or some other modern methodology.
Consequently, the Second Restatement has served the interests
of justice better than the First Restatement, and thus constituted a
significant progress in the choice of law jurisprudence.224  Not sur-
prisingly, the Second Restatement still maintains its momentum
and appeal.  As recently as May 2006, the Supreme Court of Ne-
vada adopted the most significant relationship test of the Second
Restatement and overruled its previous decision in Motenko v.
MGM Dist., Inc.225 that replaced lex loci delicti with a hybrid
approach.226
Therefore, the preferred course of action is for courts and legal
scholars to acknowledge the drawbacks of the Second Restatement
and build upon its success to achieve consolidation, greater uni-
formity, and predictability in the choice of law jurisprudence.  The
next section outlines and examines several suggestions in this area.
219. See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 804 (Ind. 2004).
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 202. R
222. See Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 415-19 (Ga. 2005) (disagree-
ing with an employee’s argument for application of a Missouri law that allowed a tort
action against the employer, in a personal injury action brought by a Georgia em-
ployee of a Missouri corporation injured on a work site in Georgia).
223. Id.
224. See Symeonides, supra note 186, at 445 (“[T]he Second Restatement . . . has
helped liberate the courts from the confines of the First Restatement without placing
them under a different yoke.”).
225. 921 P.2d 933, 935 (Nev. 1996).
226. See GMC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of State of Nev., 134 P.3d 111, 116 (Nev.
2006) (adopting the Second Restatement as Nevada’s choice of law methodology for
tort cases).
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D. Some Enhancements for the Second Restatement
Many scholars proposed enhancements to the Second Restate-
ment and argued that work should commence on the Third Re-
statement.227  These proposals, however, were mostly concerned
with simplifying the analytical framework of the Second Restate-
ment and not with the wide discretion it provided.228  A number of
proposals call for drastic changes stimulating vigorous academic
discussions that are unlikely to lead to any practical changes in the
foreseeable future.229  After all, the work on the Second Restate-
ment that signified a radical departure form the First Restatement
lasted seventeen years, and the American Law Institute has no
plans to start work on the Third Restatement of Conflict of Laws
any time soon.230
At the same time, the current Second Restatement rules are in-
adequate for products liability conflicts,231 especially in multi-state
class actions.232  The predictability of court decisions is no less im-
portant in choice of law than it is in any other area of law.233  As
discussed above, the consistency, uniformity, and predictability of
227. See, e.g., Posnak, Restatement Second, supra note 204 at 571-72; Symeonides,
supra note 186, at 439-40. But see Aaron D. Twerski, One Size Does Not Fit All:  The
Third Multi-Track Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 75 IND. L.J. 667, 667 (2000) (argu-
ing for a multi-track Third Restatement incorporating major competing choice of law
theories as separate tracks).
228. See, e.g., Posnak, Restatement Second, supra note 204, at 571-72 (proposing
retaining only two jurisdiction-selecting rules to allocate the burden of production and
to raise presumptions that a functional analysis may rebut, elimination of contact
identifying and characterization steps, as well as all rigid rules, extending section 6
factors by adding a “better law” rule, making the section 6 factors exclusive, and pro-
viding a rule for handling false conflicts).
229. See id.; see also Louise Weinberg, A Structural Revision of the Conflicts Re-
statement, 75 IND. L.J. 475, 479-97 (2000) (arguing for the elimination of the most
significant contacts rule, in favor of a lex fori presumption, for making and updated
section 6 a central point of the choice of law mechanics of the new Restatement, and
for the adoption as opposed to the choice of better law).
230. See, e.g., Juenger, Third Restatement, supra note 64, at 410 (arguing that it R
would be premature to embark on the task of drafting the Third Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws); Twerski, supra note 227,  667 (“Any attempt to draft a traditional third
restatement of conflicts will quickly deteriorate into irreconcilable conflict between
academicians, judges, and members of the bar who favor one or another approach to
choice of law.”); see also supra Part I for a detailed discussion of historic develop-
ments that led to the publication of the Second Restatement.
231. See Symeonides, supra note 186, at 442.
232. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
2005:  Nineteenth Annual Survey, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 559, 617 (2005) (discussing an
unpublished New Jersey products liability case where the court had to examine laws
of fifty states to make it choice of law decision).
233. See id. at 448.
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choice of law decisions are especially important in the products lia-
bility context.  Therefore, it would be better to make some practi-
cal steps in that direction now, rather than argue about sweeping
changes and extreme proposals.  In order to minimize the impact
on the existing choice of law jurisprudence, a separate Products
Liability Restatement of Conflict of Laws234 could provide sections
dealing specifically with choice of law issues in products liability
cases.  It is important that these new sections strike the right bal-
ance between rigid rules akin to lex loci delicti and the unlimited
discretion provided by the Second Restatement.  On the one hand,
it is extremely unlikely that courts used to the freedom of the Sec-
ond Restatement would give it up in favor of a rigid set of rules.235
On the other hand, it is impossible to improve uniformity and pre-
dictability of choice of law decisions without limiting, at least to
some extent, the discretion that the Second Restatement provides.
One of the obvious sources for inconsistency and unpredictabil-
ity of choice of law decisions is that the Second Restatement allows
issue-by-issue choice of law decisions also known as depecage.236
In Simon, the Indiana Supreme Court, relying on the works of sev-
eral academic writers, advanced a number of reasons for its strong
rejection of depecage.237  The court expressed concerns that depe-
cage could circumvent legislative intent and hinder public policies
of the involved states.238  In other words, if courts apply laws
outside of the context of other laws of their jurisdiction, the appli-
cation of hybrid law might produce unfair results that are impossi-
ble under the law of any particular jurisdiction.239  The court also
pointed out that depecage could give an unfair advantage to a
party with better access to legal resources.240
All of these are legitimate concerns.  As the Rowe case shows,
however, a plaintiff can creatively use the doctrine of depecage
against a defendant with much greater access to legal resources.241
234. The American Law Institute used a similar approach in creating a specialized
products liability restatement of torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY (1998).
235. See Southerland, Value Judgments, supra note 2, at 501 (“[V]alue judgments, R
not methodologies, underpin the work of the courts.”).
236. See discussion supra Part I.D.
237. See Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 801-03 (Ind. 2004).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 803.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.  In his appellate brief, the plaintiff R
argued that, under the New Jersey choice of law rules, the court should consider the
choice of law issue separately from the issue of liability. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at
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But the main issue here is that if courts apply hybrid law that does
not exist in any state, they might reach completely unpredictable
and inconsistent results.  In the products liability area depecage
creates an uncertain legal environment and makes it impossible to
estimate business risks associated with the marketing of a particu-
lar product.
The ultimate question is whether the extra flexibility depecage
provides is worth the extra litigation, the increased burden on the
judicial system, the increased inconsistency of decisions, and the
potential unfair advantage to some types of litigants.  Given the
fact that many courts are still struggling with the purported com-
plexity of modern choice of law methodologies,242 while others are
still faithful to the traditional approach,243 there is hardly any justi-
fication for a doctrine that adds an extra layer of uncertainty to
what already appears to many as a highly inconsistent and complex
system.244  Even without depecage, the Second Restatement pro-
vides courts with the flexibility to rationalize almost any decision.
Therefore, depecage can be excluded from the Second Restate-
ment, at least for products liability cases, without a significant im-
pact on judicial discretion.
As discussed in Part II.C, the application of the Second Restate-
ment rules requires courts and the parties to the lawsuit to engage
in a detailed analysis of the implicated substantive law and corre-
sponding public policies.  Making the new products liability choice
of law rules content-blind will lead to judicial economy, reduce
burden on the parties, and with carefully drafted rules, improve
uniformity of results.245  Such rules can provide a fairly close ap-
proximation of actual court decisions without the overhead of the
current methodologies.246
New products liability sections in a Third Restatement can pro-
vide the parties to the suit with an option to choose applicable law
10, Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 892 A.2d 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006)
(No. A-59,454) .
242. See supra note 199. R
243. See, e.g., Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 804 (Ind. 2004) (refusing to abandon lex loci
delicti).
244. See Symeonides, 21st Century, supra note 217, at 87 (“While flexibility is pref-
erable to uncompromising rigidity, too much flexibility can lead to too much uncer-
tainty with all concomitant adverse consequences.”).
245. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability:  The 1990s
and Beyond, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1247, 1335-36 (2004) [hereinafter Symeonides, Choice of
Law for Products Liability] (arguing that not all choice of law rules should be content-
oriented).
246. Id. at 1341-48.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-5\FUJ501.txt unknown Seq: 37 28-NOV-07 11:13
2007] CHOICE OF LAW AND PREDICTABILITY 1453
from a limited list determined by a pre-defined set of rules and can
give a preference of choice to the plaintiff.247  In addition to simpli-
fying the choice of law process, this will lead to more predictable
results by ex ante limiting options for the applicable law.
At the same time, the new rules would retain some discretion for
the court to adjust the choice of law selection according to its value
judgments and policy preferences.  Thus, the choice of law rules
would produce a result that the courts would treat as a presump-
tion that is valid unless it contradicts important public policy con-
siderations.  Alternatively, the courts can retain discretion to
choose the law governing damages under general choice of law
rules for tort cases.248
These proposed changes can improve uniformity and predictabil-
ity of choice of law decisions in the products liability area without
the need for a total overhaul of the Second Restatement.
E. Federal Preemption for Some Types of Products
As discussed earlier, the territorial rule of lex loci delicti and the
policy-oriented methodology of the Second Restatement were in-
herently rooted in the idea of state sovereignty.  Although there is
merit to this approach,249 to a significant extent it became incom-
patible with the increased globalization of economic activities.
Some commentators have even questioned the value of national
sovereignty in this context.250
Even if the modest changes this Comment proposes are imple-
mented, it will take many years until they produce a noticeable im-
provement in the products liability area.  A more immediate way
to improve uniformity and predictability would be federal legisla-
tion governing choice of law rules or the rules of liability.251
247. See id. at 1322-32 for an overview of several sets of content-blind choice of law
rules; see also Robert A. Sedler, Choice of Law in Conflicts Torts Cases:  A Third
Restatement or Rules of Choice of Law?, 75 IND. L.J. 615, 630-33 (2000) (criticizing
Dean Symeonides’s approach and proposing his own set of choice of law rules for
products liability cases).
248. See Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability, supra note 245, at 1332 R
(arguing that courts’ selection of law governing damages awards will lead to more
balanced decisions if the choice of law for liability turns out to favor the plaintiff).
Retaining this limited depecage provision will still be a considerable improvement
over the unlimited depecage rule of the Second Restatement.
249. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42-48 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing for the protection of state sovereignty from federal encroachment and for pre-
serving the right of states to socio-economic experimentation).
250. See, e.g., Juenger, Third Restatement, supra note 64, at 415. R
251. See Gottesman, supra note 202, at 49-50 (arguing for a federal choice of law R
statute).
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Although some authors express hope that means other then fed-
eral legislation can bring about uniformity of decisions in the prod-
ucts liability area,252 given the strong federalist stance of the
Supreme Court253 and no plans for the Third Restatement, this ap-
pears to be highly unlikely.  The Erie doctrine and its logical exten-
sion in Klaxon, directing the federal courts to use choice of law
rules of the forum state, are still an essential part of the Supreme
Court jurisprudence.254  Therefore, without federal legislation es-
tablishing a uniform approach to choice of law issues, both state
and federal courts will continue to apply methodologies that vary
from state to state and render inconsistent and often unpredictable
decisions.
The recently adopted tort reform legislation, Class Action Fair-
ness Act, that federalizes procedural aspects of certain nationwide
class actions255 does not address related choice of law issues defer-
ring them to the states, and thus exacerbates the problem.256  The
new legislation amends the statutory provision on diversity juris-
diction257 to move many interstate class actions into federal
courts,258 but the courts still have to apply the choice of law rules of
the forum.259
252. See Gregory T. Miller, Comment, Behind the Battle Lines:  A Comparative
Analysis of the Necessity to Enact Comprehensive Federal Products Liability Reforms,
45 BUFF. L. REV. 241, 274 (1997).
253. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, A Case for Recognizing Unenumerated Powers of
Congress, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 561-62 (2005) (describing the revival
of federalism by a more conservative Supreme Court under the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist).
254. See Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (declaring federal gen-
eral common law unconstitutional, and thus, upholding state rights); Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
255. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2007).
256. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Fairness Act:  Settled Expectations in
a World of Unsettled Law:  Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1867 (2006) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Class Action Fairness
Act].  Some authors, however, argue that choice of law issues that complicate the class
action certification process play a positive role. See, e.g., Jeremy T. Grabill, Multistate
Class Actions Properly Frustrated By Choice-Of-Law Complexities:  The Role of Par-
allel Litigation in the Courts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 299, 320-21 (2005) (citing efficiency of a
diversified decisionmaking as a possible benefit).  There is little doubt, however, that
these perceived benefits come at the expense of uniformity and predictability of
decisions.
257. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332.
258. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 extended federal diversity jurisdiction
to include class actions where the amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars
and no member of the class of plaintiffs is a citizen of the same state as any of the
defendants. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2).
259. See Issacharoff, Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 256, at 1867. R
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Although a sweeping federal preemption in the products liability
area is highly unlikely,260 it may be possible for some types of na-
tionally marketed products already heavily regulated by the federal
government, such as pharmaceutical products and medical devices
regulated by the FDA.261  By eliminating the choice of law issue, a
comprehensive federal regulation of pharmaceutical products and
manufacturers’ liability can provide a uniform and reasonably pre-
dictable treatment of products liability controversies in this area.
The main concern is whether this legal regime provides enough
safety for the consumers.
There are indications that the FDA oversight may be inade-
quate.  For example, it is possible that the negative side effects of a
drug might manifest themselves years after the drug’s initial FDA
approval and release to the market.262  Unfortunately, there are no
reliable controls in place that can ensure timely identification of
dangerous side effects of FDA-approved drugs already on the mar-
ket.  As Professor Conk explained in his recent article, under the
current system, drug manufacturers voluntarily analyze reports of
suspected adverse side effects of their mass-marketed FDA-ap-
proved products.263  This system, however, has been rendered, at
least to some extent, ineffective by the inherent conflict of interests
built into it.264
The reliance on FDA approvals, the approach endorsed by the
Michigan products liability statute,265 may therefore be inadequate
to provide drug safety.  An improvement of FDA procedures could
help, but in the long run, a statutory provision for a private cause
of action would provide assurance that drug manufacturers exer-
260. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 208, at 668-75 (arguing that for the conservative R
Supreme Court, state sovereignty trumps pro-defendant considerations).
261. See, e.g., National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3743 (1986).  Some authors argue that federal agencies, including the FDA,
are already moving in this direction through the introduction of federal preemption
preambles in the regulations they issue. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkley, Preemption
by Preamble:  Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 227 (2007) (discussing a “backdoor federalization” of tort law).
262. Birth defects and other health problems caused by the drug DES were proba-
bly the best-known examples of this problem. See, e.g., Trahan v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 505 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (plaintiff developed cancer many years
after her mother ingested DES during pregnancy).
263. George W. Conk, Restructure FDA Review, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 26, 2005, at col.
1.
264. Id.
265. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2007); see also supra note
130 and accompanying text. R
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cise reasonable care in testing, manufacturing, and labeling their
products.266
This approach has additional advantages.  First, it is easier to
fine-tune a solution that is specific to a particular industry and then
use gained experience to facilitate future enactments.  Further, the
limited scope of the legislation reduces the risk of unforeseen nega-
tive consequences.
CONCLUSION
The changing socio-economic landscape of American society led
to corresponding changes in law governing it.  The evolution of
conflict of laws theories was not an exception.  The rigid, archaic
rules of the First Restatement and the vague choice of law princi-
ples of the Second Restatement are inadequate to provide gui-
dance to the courts and manufacturers of mass-marketed
undifferentiated goods in products liability litigation.
There is a clear need for a new choice of law approach that will
provide product manufacturers with a more predictable business
environment and reduce unnecessary litigation.  The current politi-
cal realities, however, will likely prevent the adoption of a solution
that can significantly improve predictability and uniformity of
choice of law decisions in products liability cases.
This Comment proposes to enhance the Second Restatement’s
ability to guide courts on choice of law issues in products liability
cases.  For some types of products that are already heavily regu-
lated by the federal government, federal preemption eliminating
choice of law issues altogether can provide more uniform and pre-
dictable decisions in products liability cases.  A more realistic ap-
proach would focus on incremental changes that improve the
predictability of the business environment for product manufactur-
ers and fuel new theoretical debates leading to a more comprehen-
sive solution.
266. Some commentators argue, however, that FDA regulation is sufficient and
that the role of tort law should be limited to the enforcement of regulatory compli-
ance. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation:
An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994).
